Technical validation

Measured results, with their limits.

Each record identifies a capability, test method, observed result, release and limitation. These are vendor-run tests and private pilot checkpoints, not independent certification or general production qualification.

Raw packet captures, source addresses, credentials and private audit logs are not published.

ProductSearch evidence

4 evidence records

VM observed · 2.3.6-rc4 Iron-Hive

Automatic local detection and bounded XDP enforcement

HoneyMesh Core Beta

Method: Vendor-run isolated Ubuntu 24.04 AMD64 VMs with selected and independent control sources; generic XDP.
Observed: Controlled TCP trap interactions created local grants. Separate 120-second expiry, 600-second reboot recovery, and 12,000-response reference workload tests passed their scoped checks.
Limit: Earlier and later RC4 candidates contributed different observations. This does not establish native-XDP line rate, broad false-positive rates or general production reliability.
Debian artifact SHA-256: fbd192d23acbe1f02c68934c34aeadf06cb40adac3da0096c7789b1a65c6ebf5
Source revision: b47095a81d0b09d9084b4c961ddad49c50afa3d1

Read the report or status

VM observed · 2.3.6-rc2 Iron-Hive

Three-node manual ban propagation

HoneyMesh Infrastructure

Method: Operator-issued ban on host A in an isolated AMD64 lab; separate banned and control clients across five IPv4 TCP, UDP and ICMP cases.
Observed: Hosts A, B and C stopped replying to the selected source while the unbanned control kept reaching tested listeners.
Limit: This was a manual-ban rc2 lab. It does not qualify automatic detection, current RC4 Exchange retraction, IPv6 federation or customer production load.
Debian artifact SHA-256: 37aef1515a344f5a2f7cefc993c87b5976eb9da33127ebd22975e6b8f87fc15c

Read the report or status

Component tested · 0.1.2 private signed candidate

Application-level limits without a host agent

HoneyMesh Node Guard

Method: Unprivileged no-agent container with an entitlement, controlled invalid requests, independent control traffic and operator release.
Observed: The signed candidate limited the selected application source while control requests continued. Paid sandbox invoices selected distinct entitlements.
Limit: Private pilot evidence. Hosted-platform attribution, customer installation and full recovery are not yet qualified; package checkout is closed.

Read the report or status

VM observed · 2.3.6-rc4-nodepro2 private signed candidate

Application-owned IPv6 grant on generic XDP

HoneyMesh Node Pro

Method: Disposable Ubuntu VM, signed Node Pro bundle, paid sandbox entitlement fixture, isolated app identities, selected and control clients.
Observed: One scoped app-owned grant blocked the selected IPv6 source; control traffic stayed reachable and release restored connectivity.
Limit: One producer path and one address family in this run. Full four-owner, Exchange lifecycle and customer installation gates remain open.

Read the report or status

Verify the signed Core package See the earlier proof of concept

Loading HoneyMesh...

Measured results, with their limits.

Raw packet captures, source addresses, credentials and private audit logs are not published.

Automatic local detection and bounded XDP enforcement

HoneyMesh Core Beta

Method

Vendor-run isolated Ubuntu 24.04 AMD64 VMs with selected and independent control sources; generic XDP.

Observed

Controlled TCP trap interactions created local grants. Separate 120-second expiry, 600-second reboot recovery, and 12,000-response reference workload tests passed their scoped checks.

Limit

Earlier and later RC4 candidates contributed different observations. This does not establish native-XDP line rate, broad false-positive rates or general production reliability.

Debian artifact SHA-256

fbd192d23acbe1f02c68934c34aeadf06cb40adac3da0096c7789b1a65c6ebf5

Source revision

b47095a81d0b09d9084b4c961ddad49c50afa3d1

Read the report or status

Three-node manual ban propagation

HoneyMesh Infrastructure

Method

Operator-issued ban on host A in an isolated AMD64 lab; separate banned and control clients across five IPv4 TCP, UDP and ICMP cases.

Observed

Hosts A, B and C stopped replying to the selected source while the unbanned control kept reaching tested listeners.

Limit

This was a manual-ban rc2 lab. It does not qualify automatic detection, current RC4 Exchange retraction, IPv6 federation or customer production load.

Debian artifact SHA-256

37aef1515a344f5a2f7cefc993c87b5976eb9da33127ebd22975e6b8f87fc15c

Read the report or status

Application-level limits without a host agent

HoneyMesh Node Guard

Method

Unprivileged no-agent container with an entitlement, controlled invalid requests, independent control traffic and operator release.

Observed

The signed candidate limited the selected application source while control requests continued. Paid sandbox invoices selected distinct entitlements.

Limit

Private pilot evidence. Hosted-platform attribution, customer installation and full recovery are not yet qualified; package checkout is closed.

Read the report or status

Application-owned IPv6 grant on generic XDP

HoneyMesh Node Pro

Method

Disposable Ubuntu VM, signed Node Pro bundle, paid sandbox entitlement fixture, isolated app identities, selected and control clients.

Observed

One scoped app-owned grant blocked the selected IPv6 source; control traffic stayed reachable and release restored connectivity.

Limit

One producer path and one address family in this run. Full four-owner, Exchange lifecycle and customer installation gates remain open.

Read the report or status